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Abstract 
This paper attempts to explain decision-making structures in Swiss politics. Decision-making 
structures describe the relations between collective actors collaborating and fighting for 
influence in a policy network and are defined by two main dimensions, which are power and 
conflict. For the explanation of decision-making structures, the paper relies on factors such as 
Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the pre-parliamentary phase and the 
referendum. I assume that these different factors interact with each other when they influence 
the decision-making structure. In order to assess the importance of these factors, the paper 
compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 
2006. The analysis relies on an innovative integration of two methods. In a first step, I apply 
Social Network Analysis to describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures. In a 
second step, in order to detect the different combinations of causes which lead to different 
structures, the 11 cases are compared by a Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA). The 
results suggest that all five factors are important to understand decision-making structures and 
that equifinality and conjunctural causation are at work.  
                                                          
1
 Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the ASNA (Applications of Social Network Analysis) 
Conference, University of Zurich, September 2009, at the ―séminaire du staff‖, Department of political science, 
University of Geneva, March 2010, and at the ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Münster, March 2010. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper attempts to explain political decision-making structures. A decision-making 
structure represents the specific patterns of relations between collective actors which are 
collaborating, fighting and struggling for influence in a policy network. It is defined by 
mainly two dimensions, which are power and conflict (see Laumann and Pappi 1976, Kriesi 
1980, Waarden 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke et al. 1996, Kriesi et al. 2006a). Decision-making 
structures are important because of their influence on the output of the decision-making 
processes (e.g. Knoke 1990, Sciarini 1994, 1996, Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998, Marsh and 
Smith 2000, Fischer et al. 2003). However, there is an important question that logically 
precedes the question on the relationship between the decision-making structure and the 
output. One has to detect why a given decision-making structure forms (Jönsson et al. 1998: 
332, König and Bräuninger 1998: 446, Linder 2005: 117). Thus, this paper raises the 
following question: How can one explain political decision-making structures? 
To answer this question, the present paper compares the 11 most important decision-making 
processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. By doing so, it attempts to establish the 
factors that are responsible for a specific decision-making structure to form. The factors that 
are expected to influence the decision-making structure are Europeanization, media presence, 
the pre-parliamentary phase, federalism and the referendum. There exist several studies 
analyzing the influence of one of these factors on decision-making structures (or a dimension 
of it). However, given the increasing complexity of political systems (Hall 2003, Schmitter 
2009), it is very implausible that one factor alone can fully explain decision-making 
structures. For instance, the literature on Europeanization (siehe Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 
255f., Börzel and Risse 2003: 60, Radaelli 2003: 27, Schmidt 2006: 671, Haverland 2007) or 
on federalism (Braun 2000: 5, 11) ask no longer whether, but how, and under which 
circumstances these factors influence decision-making structures. Therefore, this study 
considers the joint impact of different factors and their possible interactions. Moreover, while 
the literature traditionally tended to attribute a specific decision-making structure to a whole 
country, it is now acknowledged that differences between policy domains are more relevant 
and that no single pattern of decision-making structure exists within one country. Therefore, 
the present analysis concentrates on the level of policy domains within one country (Laumann 
and Knoke 1987, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Waarden 1992, Knoke et al. 1996, Kriesi et al. 
2006a). Besides simply highlighting the important differences between policy domains, this 
sectoral approach also makes use of this variance in order to identify the factors that affect 
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decision-making structures. A first objective of the paper is thus to detect the causal paths that 
lead to different decision-making structures. 
The second aim is methodological, as the paper is supposed to demonstrate the utility of 
applying a sequential mixed methods design. Concretely, the study combines Social Network 
Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994, Carrington et al. 2005) and Qualitative-
Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). Social Network Analysis – as a tool 
to precisely describe cases – and QCA – as a tool to systematically compare them – combine 
very well for the analysis of complex phenomena such as decision-making structures 
(Spreitzer and Yamasaki 2008). On the one hand, my analysis will show that tools of SNA are 
very valuable for the process of calibration of the different dimensions of decision-making 
structures. On the other hand, it provides a demonstration of the fruitful combination of SNA 
and QCA. Note however that QCA emphasizes the dialogue between theoretical ideas and 
empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000) and that this paper is but a first step of this dialogue. 
Therefore, the results of the comparative analysis in the second part of the paper are to be 
taken with caution as they do not constitute ―final‖, robust findings, but more intermediate 
results to be worked on. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter two discusses the link of policy networks and 
decision-making structures and introduces the two main constitutive dimensions of decision-
making structures. The different factors that are expected to influence the decision-making 
structure are presented in chapter three. Chapter four presents the methods, the data and the 
calibration of the outcome and the conditions. Results are presented in chapter five, chapter 
six concludes. 
 
2 Policy networks and decision-making structures 
By their multiple relations, collective actors that are part of a political system – such as state 
actors, political parties, interest groups or regional actors – form a policy network. Such 
policy networks can be observed at the level of the whole political system (e.g. Kriesi 1994, 
Kriesi 2007) or at the level of single policy domains (e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and 
Coleman 1989, Schneider 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke et al. 1996). In the context of this 
paper, a policy network is defined as a general and neutral term expressing the fact that 
different actors are connected by different kinds of relations (Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994, 
Sciarini 1995, 1996, Kriesi et al. 2006a, Kriesi 2007).2 The structure that the policy network 
                                                          
2
 Note however that there exists certain confusion in the literature on the definition of a policy network. First, the 
concept is used as a metaphor for any type of relations between actors in a policy domain, but it is not backed by 
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assumes is specified by the decision-making structure. This specific structure has an influence 
on the output of the process (siehe z.B. Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 50ff., Kriesi 1994: 21, 
Kriesi and Jegen 2001: 251, Marsh and Smith 2001: 536, Christopoulos 2008: 476).
3
 Note 
however that decision-making structures are quite general descriptions and that phenomena on 
a more micro-level, such as strategic interactions between single actors, are not caught on this 
level of abstraction. A decision-making structure should therefore be conceived of as a 
general map of the decision-making process, which delivers an overview of the structural 
positions of the different actors (Dowding 1995: 157).
4
  
Decision-making structures contain two constitutive dimensions, which are power and 
conflict. These are two of the most basic and important concepts of political science. As 
Heclo (1974: 304) states:  
„Tradition teaches that politics is about conflict and power.―  
These two dimensions are strongly linked and condition each other. On the one hand, 
knowing which actors are powerful without being aware of their positions is of little use. On 
the other hand, identifying the different positions is not very interesting without looking at 
which actor is able to enforce its positions. Given this close connection, power and conflict 
are often jointly analyzed in the literature (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Sabatier 1987, 
Knoke et al. 1996, Fischer et al. 2003, Sciarini et al. 2004, Kriesi et al. 2006a). In what 
follows, I describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures. 
 
2.1 Power 
Max Weber defines power as 
„…any chance to achieve its own will in a social relationship even against resistance.‖ 
(Weber 1980, cited in Weiss 1996: 306).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
any empirical observations. This lack of empirical basis makes it difficult to use a policy network as a part of a 
causal model to be tested empirically (Dowding 1995, 2001, Christopoulos 2008). Second, the concept is also 
used not as a neutral term, but as a new and qualitatively different form of policy making, situated between the 
state and the market. This again is problematic because the promising concept can then only be applied to a very 
restricted number of situations.   
3
 Marsh und Smith (2000: 9) rightly emphasize that this relation between decision-making structures and the 
output of the decision-making process is not unidirectional, but that the output also influences the decision-
making structures due to a feedback-mechanisms. However, this „dialectial model― is too complicated and 
therefore of little use for analytic and empirical applications (Dowding 2001: 102). 
4
 Note that this conception also implies that temporal development of a decision-making process is neglected. 
The different phases of the process are analyzed together, therefore decision-making structures as reconstructed 
in this paper represent a simplified, synthetic and map of the decision-making process.   
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The question of who possesses power is one of the most basic questions in political science 
(see e.g. Dahl 1961). The objective is to find out which actor is able to impose its policy 
objectives and thereby to influence political decision-making (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, 
Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994, Knoke et al. 1996, Sciarini et al. 2004). This can be conceived of 
as a hierarchy, with the most powerful actor at the top and the other actors occupying the 
ranges according to their relative power. Two elements define the form of such a power 
hierarchy. On the one hand, one has to define which actor or type of actor is most powerful. 
On the other hand, power can be concentrated in the hands of just a few actors or it can be 
shared among several actors.  
Concerning the first aspect, the dominant actor, the most important distinction is whether state 
actors or non-state actors dominate the decision-making process. This distinction is guided by 
the logic of the function of the actors in the political system. While representatives of the 
central state are official decision-makers presumed to defend the general interest, non-state 
actors try to get as much access as possible to the decision-making process and to influence 
the output according to their interests. The comparison of the central state‘s power compared 
to its societal and political environment serves to evaluate to which degree the state is 
autonomous in its decisions (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Skocpol 1985, Atkinson and Coleman 
1989, Schmidt 2006). The category of state actors contains representatives of the federal 
government and the federal administration. Non-state actors include political parties, interest 
groups, and the cantons. 
The second aspect emphasizes the form of the power hierarchy between the actors.  The 
question is to which degree power is distributed among the actors. The most influent actor can 
be very dominating in the sense that he is the only one that really influences the decision-
making process, while the rest of the actors play only minor roles. Alternatively, power can be 
largely distributed among several actors and no one clearly dominates the structure. In this 
case, no single actor can impose its preferences, but a high number of actors can potentially 
influence the decision (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Kriesi et al. 
2006a). 
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2.2 Conflict 
Like power, conflict is one of the most basic and classic concepts of political science.
5
 In a 
modern political system, where a lot of different actors with different interests interact, 
conflict is unavoidable (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26). It is  
„…an endemic, necessary feature of any decision-making apparatus, which poses the 
fundamental functional problem of establishing binding priorities among competing 
goals.― (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26). 
Conflict is thus an important dimension of decision-making structures between political actors 
(e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992, Knoke 1993, Kriesi  et al. 
2006a).
6
 It has two important characteristics. On the one hand, it is important to assess the 
substance of the conflict, thus the nature of the conflict line. On the other hand, conflict can 
be strong or weak. 
The conflict line is defined by assessing which actors oppose each other. The substance of the 
conflict is inferred from the information on the opposing actors. Nowadays, two conflict lines 
are relevant in politics (Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006b, 2008).7 First, an old and important 
conflict line exists between the market and the state, where the traditional right opposes the 
traditional left. While the right and bourgeois parties as well as employers‘ associations and 
interest groups of the economy defend free markets, left parties and unions defend more state 
intervention. Second, there exists a newer, but lately very important conflict between 
defenders of openness of a country and defenders of its traditions. In this case, the 
nationalistic SVP and representatives of the domestic economy oppose the center-right 
parties, the representatives of the export economy as well as the political left.  
The second aspect, the intensity of the conflict, gives an idea on how much the opposing 
positions differ from each other. There is reason to believe that conflict is more intense if 
fundamentally different values and ideologies oppose each other. If the disagreement is only 
                                                          
5
 Already in the early 20
th
 century, Carl Schmitt defines politics as the differentiation between friends and 
enemies (see e.g. Rieger 1995). 
6
 Note that studies about conflict in Swiss politics are quite rare, which might be due to the fact that Switzerland 
is often seen as being the consensus democracy par excellence, where institutions and the political culture foster 
consensus building (Neidhart 1970, Kriesi 1980, Lijphart 1999). For instance, it is not yet clear how exactly the 
degree of Europeanization or the intensity of the pre-parliamentary phase influence the level of conflict 
(Neidhart 1970, Sciarini et al. 2002, Nicolet et al. 2003, Sciarini 2006). 
7
 Originally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify 4 main conflict lines (cleavages) between capital and work, land 
and urban interests, state and church, and center and periphery. It is argued that the classic cleavages lose 
salience or adapt because of economic and cultural developments. 
.  
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about technical details, conflict is supposed to be less intense (see the three levels of opinions 
in Sabatier 1987, 2006).  
 
3 Factors affecting the conflict structure 
In order to find an explanation for the different decision-making structures, I take into account 
five factors. As mentioned in the introduction, I expect these factors to jointly influence the 
decision-making structure. However, given the more explorative nature of this analysis and 
the high number of possible interactions, I will not formulate hypotheses about the joint 
impact of these factors on the decision-making structures. In order to nevertheless guide the 
lecturer, expectations about their independent influence are formulated at the end of the 
presentation of each factor. I take into account factors already included in earlier studies 
(Sciarini et al. 2002, Nicolet et al. 2003, Sciarini 2006), namely the intensity of the pre-
parliamentary phase and the degree of Europeanization. Additionally, I introduce three other 
factors, which are media presence, federalism and the referendum.
8
   
 
3.1 Europeanization 
The influence of the European Union even on non-memberstates like Switzerland is well 
assessed in the literature (Mach et al. 2003, Sciarini et al. 2004, Fischer 2005). 
Europeanization describes the phenomenon that more and more formerly domestic decision-
making processes are influenced by the European environment. Not only is the substance of 
public policies affected, but also the institutions of the decision-making process and the 
relations among political actors is influenced (Sciarini et al. 2004). First, because of the 
existence of international negotiations, state actors are expected to dominate Europeanized 
processes. Second, such processes tend to be closed, which makes that power is rather 
concentrated in the hand of very few actors. Third, Europeanization has an influence on the 
conflict line. It has been shown that in Europeanized cases the classical left-right division 
loses its importance and the main conflict takes place between defenders of the opening of the 
country towards the outside and defenders of traditions and international independence 
(Brunner and Sciarini 2002, Kriesi et al. 2006b, 2008). Fourth and finally, the degree of 
Europeanization of a policy domain is expected to have an influence on the conflict level. In 
                                                          
8
 I am aware of the fact that some of these factors – mainly the existence of a referendum and media presence – 
can also be seen as being a consequence more than a cause of a given decision-making structure. However, 
remember that the decision-making structure describes an overall, synthetic picture of the process from its 
beginning until the end. In this sense, all of the factors can be conceived of as causes for a given decision-
making structure. 
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this respect, two opposing theoretical arguments exist. On the one hand, problems concerning 
the opening and international exposition of the country may push internal actors to close their 
ranks (see Katzenstein 1984, 1985). In this case, conflict is expected to be lower. On the other 
hand however, the fact that Europeanized acts have a strong ―take-it-or-leave-it‖ character 
reduces the room for maneuver of internal actors such as political parties and interest groups 
(Moravcsik 1994).  
 
3.2 Media presence 
With the mediatization of politics, politics adapted a media logic and political actors have 
become more dependent on media and communication (Blumler and Kavanagh 1996, 
Wolfsfeld 1997, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). Besides the work and lobbying in the 
institutional arenas, the mobilization of the public opinion has become an important influence 
strategy for political actors. In this new context, political actors compete for media attention 
in order to attract public support for their policy plans, and thereby pressure policy-makers 
and influence political outputs (Danielian and Page 1994, Wolfsfeld 1997, Tresch 2008). Also 
political actors in Switzerland ―struggle for media attention― (Wolfsfeld 1997), as statements 
in the television or the Sunday press are said to have more important consequences than direct 
lobbying in the parliament ( Häusermann et al. 2004, Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Especially 
actors with little influence in the decision-making process can try to mobilize public attention 
and thereby expand the conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Strong media presence has the 
following consequences on the decision-making structure. First, mainly external actors are 
supposed to attempt to mobilize the public opinion by being present in the media. Therefore, 
external actors are expected to dominate the process. Second, due to the same reason, power 
tends to be largely distributed. Third, following the argument of conflict expansion, I expect 
highly mediatized acts to display higher conflict levels. The conflict line is not affected by 
this factor. 
 
3.3 The referendum 
In Switzerland, after an act has passed the usual legislative process, it can still be defeated in a 
popular referendum.
9
 If it takes place, this last phase of the decision-making process is crucial 
as it can invalid a policy project as a whole. That is why the threat of launching an optional 
                                                          
9
 There exist two kinds of referendums. One is mandatory and takes place in the case of an amendment of the 
constitution or of certain international treaties. The other kind of referendum is optional. 50‗000 citizens or 8 
cantons can request a popular vote on every federal law or decree after it was voted in parliament. 
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referendum is a strategic influence option for political actors whose interests were not taken 
into account during the decision-making process. But even when the referendum is 
mandatory, decision-makers must open up the decision-making process in order to include a 
broad range of societal interests and thereby avoid a defeat in the popular vote. In any case, 
political actors have to fight hard for their positions in a referendum campaign, as they lose 
control over the destiny of the project (Sciarini and Trechsel 1996, Linder 2005: 251). 
Therefore, whenever a referendum takes place, it influences the decision-making structure. 
First, the opening up of the process has the consequence that external actors dominate over 
state actors. Second, the same mechanisms leads to a large distribution of power. Third, the 
conflict level is high in the case of a referendum vote. The referendum has no influence on the 
conflict line. 
 
3.4 The pre-parliamentary phase 
The pre-parliamentary phase is commonly seen as the key phase in decision-making processes 
in Swiss politics, mainly for two reasons (e.g. Kriesi 1980).
10
 First, the pre-parliamentary 
phase has an important status in Swiss politics, as the possibility of a referendum makes that a 
broad range of actors must be included in order to elaborate a consensual solution from the 
very beginning on (Neidhart 1970). The pre-parliamentary phase offers a certain number of 
access points which allow non-state actors to express their view and to influence the project 
accordingly.
11
 Second, and partly because of the first reason, the pre-parliamentary phase is 
considered important because the most important decisions concerning the substance and 
form of the act are usually taken at this early stage of the decision-making process. The 
openness of the pre-parliamentary phase, that is the opportunity for external actors to access 
the decision-making arenas, is supposed to influence the decision-making structure. 
Concerning the power dimension, an open pre-parliamentary phase leads to first, a large 
distribution of power and second, a dominance of external over state actors. Further, an open 
pre-parliamentary phase should lower the conflict level among the actors involved in the 
decision-making process.
12
 The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict 
line, is not affected by this factor. 
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 As stated by Sciarini (2006: 498), the importance of this phase heavily contrasts with the lack of scientific 
knowledge about it. The studies of Kriesi (1980), Germann et al. (1985) or Poitry (1989) are outdated, the only 
recent empiric work on the pre-parliamentary is by Sciarini et al. (2002).  
11
 According to Neidhart‘s (1970) reasoning, the intense pre-parliamentary phase with several access points for 
non-state actors is designed to avoid a referendum. 
12
 However, note that Sciarini et al. (2002) find no clear results concerning the influence of the intensity of the 
pre-parliamentary phase on the level of conflict in the following stages of the process. 
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3.5 Federalism 
In federalist states decision-making and implementation competences are shared between the 
central and the regional level. Compared to other federal states, Swiss cantons even enjoy 
particularly large competences (Braun 2003, Vatter 2006). Lately, one observes a certain 
centralization of decision-making competences in Switzerland, but due to its relatively poor 
resources the federal administration stays dependent on the cantons for implementation. 
Therefore, different competences overlap between the federal and the cantonal level and 
cantons are still powerful players in Swiss politics (Germann 2002, Braun 2003, Sciarini 
2005, Sciarini and Bochsler 2006). However, the competence distribution varies between 
different policy domains and so does the influence of the cantons. In domains where cantons 
have important interests because their competences are directly concerned, societal interests 
tend to be eclipsed. But even if societal actors are less important, the importance of the 
cantons implies that external actors are dominant over state actors. It is argued that in 
federalist decision-making processes, the central state does not have to negotiate with two 
conflicting sides, but can concentrate on finding a constructive solution with only the cantons 
(see e.g. Thomas 2001: 16f., Linder 2005: 117). Power is therefore expected to be 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of actors. Additionally, the argument above 
supports that conflict is low. Federalism does not influence the nature of the conflict line.  
 
4  Methods and data 
4.1 Social Network Analysis, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and their combination 
The present analysis integrates Social Network Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994, 
Carrington et al. 2005) and Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 
2008) in a so-called sequential design (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 18, Morse 2003). The 
two methods have, with very few exceptions (Stevenson and Greenberg 2000, Spreitzer and 
Yamasaki 2008, Magetti 2009), never been combined before. However, as this application 
will show, they are highly compatible. In a first step, tools of SNA are used to characterize the 
different decision-making structures. SNA serves well for this purpose, being an approach 
that focuses on the analysis of links (power and conflict relations) between nodes (collective 
actors). Thus, it is able to describe the specific decision-making structure in the different 
networks. While the description of decision-making structures is without a doubt of great 
value for the understanding of specific decision-making processes, it cannot by itself explain 
11 
 
the formation of decision-making structures.
13
 This is why in a second step, a causal element 
is added to the research design by comparing the 11 cases in a Qualitative-Comparative 
Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). This allows detecting the multiple configurations 
of causes leading to a specific decision-making structure. QCA serves especially well to 
analyze phenomena which are supposed to be the result of multiple conjunctural causation, 
where different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome. For the present 
analysis, I rely on fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), in which the different conditions and the outcome 
to be explained can take continuous values to account for different degrees of presence of a 
phenomenon.
14
 QCA being mainly a case-based method, the definition of these values, called 
calibration, is based on the thick description of the cases. Such a calibration procedure should 
always be based on multiple indicators in order to have a complete view on the case and to 
check for consistency of the results (Goertz 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007). In the 
present analysis, the description is made with SNA-based indicators as well as with other 
empirical information out of documentary sources. As indicated above, decision-making 
structures are composed of the two main dimensions conflict and power, each containing two 
aspects. There are thus four outcomes to explain, which requires four separate fsQCA.  
 
4.2 Data 
This paper compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland 
between 2001 and 2006.
15
 The cases are the 11
th
 pension reform, the program of budget relief 
2003, the extension of the bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons and flanking 
measures, the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings, the bilateral agreement on 
Schengen/Dublin, the law on nuclear energy, the law on the infrastructure fund, the new law 
on foreigners, the reform of fiscal equalization and tasks distribution, the new constitutional 
articles on education and the law on telecommunication. 
Data on these cases was gathered through approximately 250 semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of organizations involved in the 11 decision-making processes under study. 
Based on positional, decisional, and reputational approaches (see e.g. Knoke 1993: 30), 20 to 
30 organizational actors per process were identified and interviewed. Most of the interviews 
                                                          
13
 In fact, SNA is has often be criticized to be merely descriptive (see e.g. Dowding 1995). 
14
 Note that the original, crisp-set QCA mechanism requires the dichotomization of the conditions and the 
outcome, which of course leads to quite crude measures. See Rihoux and Ragin (2008: 119) for a more extended 
discussion of the advantages of fsQCA over other forms of QCA. 
15
 This according to an exhaustive expert survey for all processes that passed a parliamentary vote between 
December 2001 and December 2006. Data were gathered for the research project ―The Swiss decision-making 
system in the 21th century: power, institutions, conflicts (Sciarini and Serdült 2006). 
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were conducted between February and July 2008. In line with the dominant conception 
(Laumann and Knoke 1987, Knoke et al. 1996: 7), the study focuses on organizations and the 
individual interview partners were asked to respond in the name of their organization. 
Additionally, the study of official documents
16
 on the cases provide me with supplementary 
information. 
 
4.3 Fuzzy-set calibration  
In what follows, I present the different indicators that were used for the calibration of the 
conditions and the outcomes of each case. Ideally, the calibration procedure relies on previous 
thick case descriptions. Due to the lack of space for such an endeavor, the raw data, that is the 
values of the different indicators for each case are presented in appendix 1. These indicators 
help to assess to which degree a case is a member of a given set. If a case is fully in a set, it 
has a fuzzy score of 1, if a case is fully out of it, a score of 0 is attributed. Intermediate scores 
like 0.8 (0.2) mean that a case is not fully, but mainly in (out of) the set, scores like 0.6 (0.4) 
mean that a case is more or less in (out of) the set. Table 1 below summarizes the codes 
accorded to the different cases. 
 
4.3.1 Calibration of the outcomes 
The first aspect of the power dimension, the dominant actor (DA), is covered by the 
membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures totally dominated by state 
actors. The negation of this set is a set of decision-making structures totally dominated by 
external, non-state actors. Indicators are based on the reputation scores for the different actors. 
These were gathered by asking interview partners to mention, from a list comprising all actors 
participating in the process, the actors they considererd to be first, very influent, and second, 
among the three most influent actors in the given decision-making structure. From this, I 
calculated on the one hand the share of actors belonging to a specific actor type (state actors, 
political parties, interest groups, cantons) compared to the total number of actors with a 
minimum reputation score of 50% (corresponding to the actors in the "core", see Kriesi 1980) 
respectively 75%.
17
 On the other hand, I defined the dominant actor type according to the 
average and the part-of-the-sum
18
 of the actor types‘ reputation score. These indicators were 
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 Mainly the governments dispatch to the parliament (―Botschaft / message‖). 
17
 Only based on the results from the ―very influent actors‖- question. 
18
 The part-of-the-sum measure was calculated in the following way: First, I summed up the reputation values of 
all single actors to a total reputation value of the process. On this basis I calculated the share of this "overall 
influence" for each group of actors. 
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calculated twice, once for the ―very influent actors‖- question and once for the ―three most 
influent actors‖-question. 
The second aspect, the distribution of power (PD), is defined by the membership scores of a 
case in the set of decision-making structures where power is largely distributed. The negation 
of this set is a set of decision-making structures with a concentration of power in the hands of 
one actor. Indicators for the attribution of membership scores are on the one hand the absolute 
number of actors in the core (gt 50%), the absolute number of actors with more that 75% of 
reputation and the absolute number of actors mentioned as one of the three most important 
ones. On the other hand, I calculated measures of kurtosis and skewness of the distribution of 
reputational scores among all the actors participating in the process.
19
 These measures 
indicate how much the distribution of reputation scores deviates from a normal distribution, 
that is how flat the distribution is and towards which side it tends. 
The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict line (CLI), gets covered by 
the membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures with a perfect left-right 
conflict line. The negation of this set is a set with a perfect openness-traditions conflict line. 
The conflict line is measured by data on the convergence and divergence of actors‘ positions 
in the process. Interview partners were asked to mention the actors with whom they had 
diverging (coded as -1) or converging (coded as 1) views on the policy project in question, 
this based on a list comprising all actors participating in that process. The resulting data 
matrix was then analyzed with two different approaches to blockmodelling, a direct and an 
indirect one. With the indirect method, the program (UCINET, Borgatti et al. 2002) first 
calculates similarities of positions in the convergence/divergence profile of the actors and 
then clusters them, beginning with the most similar ones and ending up with two blocks of 
actors who‘s profiles are the most different from each other. With the direct method, the so-
called ―generalized blockmodelling‖, the program (PAJEK, Batagelj and Mrvar 1996) directly 
rearranges the data matrix in order to find a solution that best fits the ideal structure of two 
opposing blocks (Doreian et al. 2005, Nooy et al. 2005). Both procedures identify the two 
groups of actors that most strongly oppose each other. The substantial content of the conflict 
line must then be interpreted from the actors that are part of the two opposing blocks. 
Additionally, to check for robustness of the results and to exclude non-important actors, both 
blockmodelling procedures were also performed on restricted networks containing only the 
core actors (gt 50% of reputation). 
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 These measures were calculated for the ―very influent actor‖-scale as well as for the ―three most influent 
actors‖-scale. 
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Finally, the second aspect of conflict is the conflict level (CLE). It‘s score is defined by the 
membership of the cases in the set of decision-making structures with a very high conflict 
level. The negation of this set is a set with very low conflict. Indicators of conflict are the 
following: On the one hand, I calculated the average of convergent (1) and divergent (-1) 
relations in the network. On the other hand, I calculated the average of the relations between 
the two opposing blocks identified before.
20
 Both indicators were calculated based on the 
whole network as well as on the restricted network containing only the core actors. 
 
Table 1: Fuzzy values for conditions and outcomes 
CASE     E M R P F     PD DA CLE CLI 
              
Pension 
 
  0 0.8 1 0.4 0.2 
 
  1 0.2 1 1 
Budget 
 
  0 0.2 0 0.8 0.2 
 
  0 0.8 0.6 0.8 
Savings 
 
  0.8 0.2 0 0.4 0.2 
 
  0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 
Persons 
 
  0.6 1 1 0.6 0.2 
 
  0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 
Schengen 
 
  0.8 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 
 
  0.6 1 0.6 0 
Nuclear 
 
  0.2 0.6 1 0.8 0.4 
 
  0.6 0.4 1 1 
Infrastructure 
 
  0 0.4 0 0.6 0.6 
 
  0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Foreigners 
 
  0.4 0.6 1 0.8 0.2 
 
  0.6 0.4 0.6 1 
Telecom 
 
  0.6 0.4 0 0.4 0 
 
  0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8 
Education 
 
  0.2 0.2 1 0.8 1 
 
  0.6 0 0  -  
Fiscal equal. 
 
  0.2 0.4 1 1 1 
 
  0 0.6 0.6 0.8 
                            
 
 
4.3.2 Calibration of the conditions 
The different criteria used for the calibration of the five conditions are the following. First, the 
degree of Europeanization (E) is defined by the case‘s membership in the set of fully 
Europeanized cases. The negated set is the one of fully domestic cases. Specific case 
knowledge is used to calibrate the cases. Second, the degree of media presence (M) is defined 
by the membership in the set of cases that are strongly present in the media, while the 
negation of this set is a set of cases not at all exposed to the media. This is measured with a 
proxy. From the interview data, I dispose of information about the intensity of the activities of 
the interviewed actors towards the media (press conferences, interviews, etc.) and about the 
importance of the public debate compared to the negotiations and lobbying in the decision-
making institutions. Using this data, I assume that cases where actors were actively looking 
                                                          
20
 Note that this score was calculated based on the results only from the indirect blockmodelling procedure. 
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for media attention were actually more present in the media than acts where this was less the 
case. Third, the degree of federalism (F) is defined by the membership score in the set of fully 
federalist cases. Its negation is the set of fully non-federalist cases. Case knowledge out of 
documentary sources provides me with information on the intensity to which cantons 
competences are touched by the policy project. Fourth, the referendum condition (R) is simply 
coded 1 if a referendum took place and 0 if not. Fifth and finally, the openness of the pre-
parliamentary phase (P) is covered by the case‘s membership in the set of cases with a very 
open pre-parliamentary phase. The negation is a set of cases with a very closed pre-
parliamentary phase. Two indicators are taken into account. The first is the absolute number 
of access points for external, non-state actors. The second is the ratio of the number of stages 
that constitute access points over the total number of stages that the pre-parliamentary phase 
of the decision-making process is composed of.  
 
5 Analysis and results 
5.1 Preliminary remarks 
As mentioned in the introduction, the following QCA is but a first step in the process of 
dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000). As such, the 
results should be looked at with caution. The analysis must be further revised in order to be 
able to derive statements about necessary and sufficient set-relations that are highly consistent 
with the empirical evidence and cover a maximum of the instances of the outcome. It is 
thereby especially important to resolve contradictory configurations that still exist in the 
present data.
21
  
The two aspects from each of the two dimensions of the decision-making structure will be 
analyzed separately. For each of the four analyses, only the factors for which there exist 
theoretical expectations are taken into account. The analyses were conducted with the 
software fsQCA (Ragin et al. 2009)22. The presence of the phenomenon and its absence are 
analyzed separately. Further, the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions must be 
separated and the former should precede the latter (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, Rihoux 
and Ragin 2008). Each result is accompagnied by scores of consistency and coverage, which 
are measures for the strength of the empirical support for arguments specifying set-theoretic 
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 Contradictory configurations are given when two cases display the same values of the different conditions in 
the truth table, but do not agree on the outcome. 
22
 The analysis of sufficient conditions was conducted using the Truth Table Algorithm. 
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connections (Ragin 2008: 44).
23
 The minimization procedure of the thruthtables produces 
three solutions, a parsimonious one, a complex one and an intermediate one. For lack of 
space, only the intermediate solutions will be presented and discussed in the paper.
24
 
In the present case, the analysis of necessary conditions reveals that for all of the 8 (four 
aspects plus their negations) outcomes, the highest consistency value for a necessary 
condition is 0.86 (Condition P for the outcome ~PD). Especially given the relatively small 
number of cases, this value is too low to support the claim of necessity (see Schneider and 
Wagemann 2007: 213, 231ff.). Therefore, no necessary condition exists for any of the 
outcomes. Consequently, the following analyses only look for combinations of sufficient 
conditions for the outcomes.
25
 The respective truth tables, showing which combinations are 
considered as consistent with the claim that a subset relation exists, can be found in appendix 
2. 
 
5.2 Power 
First, I look at the two aspects of power and try to detect the causal paths that lead to the 
dominance of state or external actors and to a distribution or a concentration of power. The 
analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome DA, that is the dominance of state actors 
over external actors, results in the following solution:
26
  
DA → ~R~M~E + ~F~PME  (consistency = .88 / coverage = .56). 
The term means that there exist two different combinations of conditions that are connected to 
a decision-making structure dominated by state actors. A first one consists of a non-
Europeanized policy, weak media presence and no referendum. Cases with strong 
membership in this combination are the program of budget relief or the infrastructure fund. A 
second, quite different combination of conditions is one of a Europeanized policy with strong 
                                                          
23
 Consistency indicates how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated. Like statistical significance, it 
signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of the investigator. Coverage assesses the 
degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome. Like statistical strength, it 
indicates the empirical relevance or importance of a set-theoretic connection. (Ragin 2008: 45). 
24 When minimizing the truth table, the program can make us of the logical remainders (combination of causes 
with no empirical observation due to limited diversity) in different ways. The parsimonious solution permits the 
incorporation of any logical remainder that contributes to the derivation of a logically simpler solution. The 
complex solution doesn‘t include any logical remainder at all. The intermediate solution makes only use of the 
so-called ―easy‖ logical remainders, that is the ones that do not go against existing theoretical or substantial 
knowledge. 
25
 The threshold for consistency of sufficient conditions should at least be .75. However, any major gap between 
the consistency scores closest to 1 and the others (still gt .75) can serve as a threshold (Schneider and Wagemann 
2007). 
26
 Note that by convention, capital letters indicate the presence of a phenomenon. A capital letter preceded by a ~ 
indicates absence of a phenomenon. Two letters together represent a situation of logical ―and‖. A + represents 
the logical ―or‖ and thus separates two different paths to the outcome. 
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media presence, but a closed pre-parliamentary phase and a low level of federalism. A case 
with strong membership in this combination of conditions is the bilateral agreement on 
Schengen/Dublin. Note that the first solution is, from an empirical point of view, slightly 
more important than the second one. Thus, depending on the conditions with which they 
combine, both a Europeanized policy as well as a non-Europeanized policy can lead to state 
actors‘ dominance. The same is true for media presence. The effect of the other conditions is 
in the direction that was theoretically expected, but no condition alone is sufficient to cause a 
decision-making structure dominated by state actors.  
Even three different combinations of conditions lead to the opposite outcome ~DA, that is a 
decision-making structure dominated by external actors. The solution term for this outcome 
is: 
~DA → R(M~E+PM+FP~E) (consistency = .86 / coverage = .68). 
The solution reveals that the condition of the referendum is crucial when one wants to explain 
why external actors can play an important role in a decision-making structure. The existence 
of a referendum is part of all of the three combinations that are sufficient for the outcome 
~DA. This makes obviously sense, as the referendum is the most important institution in 
Swiss politics for external actors to oppose a legislative project. However, note that first, this 
does not mean that the referendum is necessary for external actors to dominate the decision-
making structure. Second, the referendum alone is never sufficient for external actors to 
dominate a decision-making structure, but that at least two more conditions must be met. 
Three possibilities that combine with the referendum provoke the outcome ~DA. These are 
first, media presence and the absence of Europeanization, second, media presence and an 
open pre-parliamentary phase, and third, the absence of Europeanization, an open pre-
parliamentary phase and a high level of federalism of the issue. All of these solutions are of 
roughly the same empirical relevance. Cases that are strong members in the first combination 
are the pension reform, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law. Examples for 
the second possiblity are the law on nuclear energy, the new foreigners‘ law or the bilateral 
treaty on the free movement of persons. A very federalist issue dominated by the cantons, the 
constitutional article on education, represents the third path to a decision-making structure 
dominated by external actors. Again, the solution revealed that all five conditions are 
somehow connected to the outcome ~DA, and again, no single condition is enough to make 
sure that external actors dominate a decision-making structure. As part of their respective 
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combinations, the single factors however work the way they are supposed to based on 
theoretical argumentation. 
The second aspect of power was defined as the distribution of power among the actors in the 
decision-making structure. The analysis of the thruth table reveals that there exists only one 
combination of factors that can be regarded as sufficient for power to be largely distributed 
among actors. This solution is expressed by the term  
PD → ~FRM    (consistency = .94 / coverage = .59). 
The path that leads to a decision-making structure where power is distributed among several 
actors is conditioned by a non-federalist case with strong media presence and decided on in a 
referendum vote. The pension reform, the free movement of persons, the Schengen 
agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law are strong members of this 
combinations‘ set. This result suggests two things. First, it seems that the conditions of 
Europeanization and of the pre-parliamentary phase are unimportant to explain why power in 
a given decision-making structure is distributed among several actors. Second, the finding 
reveals that there is only one specific causal path with three conditions for the outcome PD. 
This fits with earlier findings on Swiss politics, stating that in general, power is not largely 
distributed and a very small number of actors are able to really influence policy making in this 
country (Kriesi 1980).  
The term of sufficiency for the opposite situation, a decision-making structure where power is 
concentrated in the hands of only very few actors, is the following: 
~PD → ~R~M~E + ME  (consistency = .82 / coverage = .64). 
Two different combinations of conditions are sufficient for a decision-making structure to be 
dominated by one or only very few actors. Both parts of the solution term have roughly the 
same empirical importance. The interesting thing is again, like in the causal chains leading to 
the domination of state actors, that the absence and the presence of the same factors play a 
role, depending on their specific combination. On the one hand, there are cases that are 
domestic, not mediatized and not subject to a referendum. Cases with strong membership in 
this combination of causes are the infrastructure fund and the program of budget relief. On the 
other hand, concentration of power is connected to the presence of Europeanization and the 
media. This is however a puzzling result as both cases with strong membership in this 
combination of conditions, that is the free movement of persons and the Schengen agreement, 
are not strong members in the set of cases with power concentration. This result needs to be 
revised.  
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5.3 Conflict 
The second dimension of decision-making structures is conflict. First, I look at what factors 
are responsible for the nature of conflict, which is expressed by the dominant conflict line 
between the actors. The degree of Europanization of the decision-making process is the only 
condition for which theoretical expectations concerning the nature of the conflict line exist. 
Consequently, I concentrate only on this factor.
27
 Analysis reveals that the absence of this 
Europeanization is sufficient for a left-right conflict line to occur: 
CLI → ~E     (consistency = .84 / coverage = .84).  
This finding is of course very trivial. For the opposite outcome, that is the negation of the 
outcome (~CLI) and thus the presence of an openness-traditions conflict line, no condition or 
combination of conditions is sufficient. The empirical evidence is not consistent enough with 
the claim that Europeanization is sufficient for the existence of an openness-traditions conflict 
line. This result is caused by the case of the law on telecommunication. In fact, this is a case 
of indirect Europeanization, but it provokes a left-right conflict line. Generally, the outcome 
of the conflict line needs further examination. For instance, more factors need to be taken into 
account in order to shed light on the question of the conditions connected with a specific 
conflict line. 
The second aspect of conflict is its intensity, the conflict level. The minimal term that 
expresses the sufficient condition for high conflict is 
CLE → ~FMR    (consistency = .94 / coverage = .53). 
Non-federalist cases with high media presence and in which a referendum takes place display 
high conflict levels. Instances with strong membership in this combination are the pension 
reform, the Schengen agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law. Note 
that interestingly, this combination of conditions is exactly the same that was already 
identified to be connected with the outcome of a large distribution of power. However, the 
two phenomena do of course not always co-occur. While the term above only expresses 
sufficiency, there can still be other, and different, combinations of conditions that lead to 
either high conflict or distribution of power. Again, the fact that only one combination of 
conditions is sufficient for high conflict fits with earlier findings and with the general idea that 
in Swiss politics, high conflict is rather rare (see FN 5). At the same time, it seems that two 
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 Note that the case of the new constitutional article on education was taken out of the cases analyzed 
concerning their conflict line. In fact, this case does not display any conflict line that makes sense, given the fact 
that all actors agreed on the final solution. 
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factors for which there exist theoretical arguments about their influence on the level of 
conflict, Europeanization and the pre-parliamentary phase, are not responsible for the 
outcome CLE. That means that their absence is not automatically associated with high 
conflict, contrary to what was expected by theory. 
The last outcome for which a solution term containing sufficient conditions needs to be 
presented is the negation of high conflict. This is the situation of a decision-making structure 
with no or low conflict among the actors. This solution term is: 
~CLE → ~M~R(E+PF)   (consistency = .91 / coverage = .40). 
It suggests that two causal paths to low conflict exist. The two sufficient combinations share 
two conditions, that is low media presence and no referendum. This finding underlines the 
link between conflict and the referendum on the one hand and media presence on the other 
hand. However, the absence of these factors is not sufficient to avoid conflict. More 
conditions need to combine with low media presence and the absence of a referendum. The 
two factors have to be combined either with a high degree of Europanization or with an open 
pre-parliamentary phase and a federal policy. A case with strong membership in the first set is 
the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings. An example for the second combination is 
the law on the infrastructure fund. Both of these possible combinations cover roughly the 
same amount of the instances of the outcome. The finding again reveals the importance of 
taking into account all the five conditions for the explanation of low conflict. All the effects 
are in the suspected direction. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper describes, compares and attempts to explain the decision-making structures in 11 
different decision-making processes in Switzerland that went through parliament between 
2001 and 2006. Decision-making structures describe the specific form that a policy network 
takes. They are important because of their consequences on the policy output of a process. 
Decision-making structures consist of two dimensions, namely power and conflict. Five 
factors, that is Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the referendum and the structure 
of the pre-parliamentary phase, were taken into account for the explanation of two aspects of 
each of the two dimensions of decision-making structures.  
The first objective of the paper was the explanation of the decision-making structures by the 
factors cited above. The main conclusions concerning this objective are the following: First, 
there exists no single necessary condition for any of the aspects that were examined. This is a 
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strong indicaton of equifinality, that is the existence of several causal paths leading to the 
same outcome. Additionally, the analyses of sufficiency revealed that in most cases, more 
than one combination of conditions is sufficient for an outcome. Second, all the results, except 
the one for the conflict line, suggest that a combination of at least two conditions is needed in 
order for it to be sufficient for the outcome. This reveals a phenomenon of conjunctural 
causation, thus a situation where different factors interact and jointly produce the outcome. 
Third, and more substantially, all the five factors played a role for the explanation of decision-
making structures. However, remember that this QCA does not display final, corroborated 
results, but is only a first step in the dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical 
evidence.  Concerning the second, methodological objective, this paper shows clearly how 
complementary SNA and QCA are and how useful such a combination can be. Social 
Network Analysis, on the one hand, is a strong tool to precisely describe phenomena such as 
decision-making structures, but it has no explanatory power per se. QCA, on the other hand, 
depends on substantive case knowledge and thick description as a basis for the systematic 
comparison of the cases.  
Of course, the present version of the paper has a certain number of weaknesses and 
limitations. First, it is clear that the QCA must be revised. Closer examination of the cases can 
reveal details that influence the calibration. The inclusion of more theoretical factors may 
allow to find more fine-grained and consistent explanations for the different outcomes. And 
finally, the application of a two-step procedure is able to take into account the underlying 
structure of the influence factors and thereby to reduce the number of logical remainders 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 256ff.). Second, 
concerning the cases under study, this analysis is of course limited to the most important 
decision-making processes. It can not automatically be claimed that the findings are valid for 
the whole range of decision-making processes in Switzerland at the beginning of the 21th 
century, or for other periods or other countries. This should be evaluated taking into account 
the specificities of the political system. The present paper delivered some elements that allow 
us to better understand the causal mechanisms between a decision-making structure and its 
context.  
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Appendix 1: Raw data used for the calibration of the outcome 
 
a) Dominant actor (DA) 
 
 
b) Power distribution (DP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CASE State Party IG Canton State Party IG Canton
Pension 31 31 38 0 30 40 30 0 Party State IG IG
Budget 33 44 11 11 67 0 0 33 Party State State State
Savings 56 11 22 11 67 0 33 0 State State State State
Persons 36 29 36 0 20 40 40 0 IG IG State IG
Schengen 50 25 13 13 100 0 0 0 Cantons State State State
Nuclear 28 28 39 6 40 20 40 0 Cantons State IG IG
Infrastructure 41 18 24 18 33 0 67 0 State State State State
Foreigners 30 40 20 10 43 57 0 0 Party State Party State
Telecom 25 25 50 0 29 57 17 0 Party Party IG IG
Education 31 23 8 31 0 50 0 50 Cantons Cantons Cantons Cantons
Fiscal equal. 20 30 20 30 67 0 0 33 Other State State State
GT 50% (core) GT 75%
Average 
influence
Average 
3 most 
influent
Part-of-
the-sum 
influence
Part-of-
the-sum 
3 most 
influent
CASE
N of actors 
(reputation 
gt 50%)
N of actors 
(reputation 
gt 75%)
N of actors 
(3 most 
influent)
Kurtosis 
(Influence)
Skewness 
(Influence)
Kurtosis     
(3 most 
influent)
Skewness 
(3 most 
influent)
Pension 13 10 22 -0.21 1.11 -0.85 0.87
Budget 9 3 16 1.65 1.60 0.06 1.23
Savings 9 3 22 -0.51 0.64 2.98 1.92
Persons 14 5 22 -1.07 0.71 0.89 1.41
Schengen 16 3 27 -1.32 0.41 1.10 1.44
Nuclear 18 5 26 -1.10 0.61 2.95 1.82
Infrastructure 17 3 25 -1.05 -0.07 10.63 2.95
Foreigners 10 7 20 0.12 1.18 1.71 1.62
Telecom 16 7 19 -1.49 0.31 5.94 2.37
Education 13 6 21 -0.98 0.50 8.55 2.64
Fiscal equal. 10 3 15 0.11 0.97 -0.34 1.11
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c) Conflict lines (CLI) 
 
 
d) Conflict level (CLE) 
 
  
CASE Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
Pension SP,Grüne,SGB, Unia, 
Travail.Suisse
FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV, 
Alliance F
SP,SGB,Travail.Suisse FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV
Budget SVP,FDP,CVP, ECO,SAV, SGV SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse
,VGB,transfair,SBV
SP FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO
Savings SVP FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SGV
,SBVg,Swissholdings,Travail.
Suisse
SBVg, Economiesuisse,  FDP
Persons SVP FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV
,SGV,SBV,SGB,Travail.Suisse
SVP FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV
,SGV,SGB,Travail.Suisse
Schengen SVP SP,CVP,FDP,Grüne,ECO, 
Travail.Suisse
SVP FDP,SP,CVP,ECO
Nuclear SP,Grüne,SGB CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,SGV SP,Grüne FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO
Infrastructure SVP,(FDP),(TCS) SP,Grüne,CVP,SGB,VCS, 
(TCS),(FDP)
CVP,SP,FDP,TCS
Foreigners SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse SVP,FDP,CVP,SBV,SGV, SAV SP,SGB SVP,FDP,CVP,SAV
Telecom SP,SGB,Swisscom,Gew. 
Kommunikation,(SVP)
FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise, 
(SVP)
SP,Swisscom,Gew. 
Kommunikation,(SVP)
FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise, 
(SVP)
Education (SVP) FDP,SP,CVP,Grüne,ECO,SGB,
(SVP)
FDP,SP,CVP,ECO
Fiscal equal. SP,IGsozNFA,(Grüne),(SGB) CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,(Grüne), 
(SGB)
SP,IGsozNFA CVP,FDP
This table reports only the most important parties and interest groups. 
Divergent results between direct and indirect blockmodeling are indicated with brackets.
Block-modeling (all) Block-modeling (core)
CASE Average all
Average bw 
coalitions (all)
Average 
core
Average bw 
coalitions 
(core)
Pension -0.04 -0.33 -0.10 -0.55
Budget 0.01 -0.24 0.30 -0.63
Savings 0.23 -0.11 0.47 0.16
Persons 0.11 -0.37 0.37 -0.85
Schengen 0.11 -0.53 0.22 -0.67
Nuclear -0.02 -0.48 -0.09 -0.69
Infrastructure 0.18 -0.03 0.21 0.01
Foreigners 0.05 -0.30 0.13 -0.64
Telecom 0.05 -0.25 0.08 -0.35
Education 0.18 0.41 0.34 0.41
Fiscal equal. 0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.45
29 
 
Appendix 2: Truth tables 
 
a) Outcome DA 
 
b) Outcome ~DA 
 
c) Outcome PD  
 
CASE E M R P F DA Consistency
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 1 1.00
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.89
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.86
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.71
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.67
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.67
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.64
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.63
CASE E M R P F ~DA Consistency
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.91
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.88
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.86
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.83
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.67
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.60
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.57
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.56
CASE E M R P F PD Consistency
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 1 1.00
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 1 1.00
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 1 1.00
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 1 1.00
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.67
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.67
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.60
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.56
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d) Outcome ~PD 
 
e) Outcome CLI 
 
f) Outcome ~CLI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE E M R P F ~PD Consistency
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 1 1.00
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.89
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.86
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.86
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.75
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.67
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.64
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.63
CASE E CLI Consistency
Pension, Nuclear, 
Foreigners, Education, Fiscal 
Equil., Infrastructure, 
Budget 0 1 0.84
Persons, Schengen, Savings, 
Telecom 1 0 0.50
CASE E ~CLI Consistency
Persons, Schengen, Savings, 
Telecom 1 0 0.72
Pension, Nuclear, 
Foreigners, Education, Fiscal 
Equil., Infrastructure, 
Budget 0 0 0.28
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g) Outcome CLE 
 
h) Outcome ~CLE 
 
CASE E M R P F CLE Consistency
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 1 1.00
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 1 1.00
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 1 1.00
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 1 1.00
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.78
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.67
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.67
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.60
CASE E M R P F ~CLE Consistency
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 1 1 1.00
Telecom, 
Savings 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83
Budget 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.78
Schengen 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.71
Persons 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.71
Education, 
Fiscal Equal. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.67
Pension 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.50
Nuclear, 
Foreigners 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.45
